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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

15 March 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SOVIET MILITARY PREPARATIONS

THE PROBLEM

, and Soviet Satellite To determine the scope and nature of Soviet military preparations and to estimate their probable purpose

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. What evidence is there of a marked and recent acceleration in Soviet/Satellite military preparations, as distinguished from the gradual strengthening of Soviet military potential which has been going on since World War II?
  - In the Far East?
  - B. In Europe?
  - C. In the USSR?
- II. What, briefly, is the present status of Soviet/Satellite military preparedness?

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- A. Are Soviet/Satellite forces ready to move now?
- B. If so, where and with what capabilities?
- C. If not, what additional preparations would be necessary?
- D. Is there any evidence to indicate that the USSR, in its military preparations, is sacrificing long-term objectives for immediate results? Is the USSR presently engaged in any military preparations which would be so costly, or would so disrupt the Soviet political, economic or military organization, that they would probably be undertaken only in anticipation of imminent hostilities? For example, is the USSR engaging in such practices as:
  - Standardising the production of military equipment to the point of curtailing the development of new models?
  - 2. Mobilising to the point of jeopardising long-range economic programs?
  - 3. Puilding extensive stockpiles of war materials of a type which deteriorate in storage or normally would be stockpiled only in anticipation of early military action?
- III. What are the probable purposes of present Soviet military preparations?

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- A. Are they of such overall magnitude as to suggest early initiation of general war?
- B. Are they primarily defensive in nature?
- C. Do they suggest early Soviet military intervention in Korea?
- D. Are they in the nature of insurance in case Sovietinitiated Satellite military moves cannot be localized or are unsuccessful?